"Turkey Contagion Fears are Overblown"
August 22, 2018
It’s been quite a hot summer for the Turkish Economy. Following the presidential election and the inauguration
of the new president, in a matter of days if not hours the Turkish Lira plunged
to its historical depths. Lira had never
lost so much value at such a speed at such a short time period. On top of the
economic problems and the failure of the new government to implement measures to
support Lira, the row with the U.S. over the jailed pastor Brunson and
President Donald Trump’s off-the-cuff twits have made things worse for the
Turkish Lira.
Now the question economists try to address is whether the initial
tremors of a financial crisis in Turkey will turn into a full-blown crisis and
whether it will generate contagion and send shock waves to other emerging
market economies. So far, the answer to the first question is all depends on
the Central Bank and the government’s ability to implement necessary measures
to support Lira. All economists agree that
without the proper response from the Central Bank the whole economy will be in
jeopardy.
Our analysis of Turkish bank stock returns and volatility
connectedness show that the current tremors in the financial sector led to
substantial increase in the connectedness of bank stocks, implying that this is
a system-wide phenomenon that affects all banks. Volatility connectedness among
the 11 bank stocks has increased from 52% at the end of March to 60% by July
10. From July 10 onwards, the volatility
connectedness continued to increase, from 60% on July 10 to 65% on July 31 and 68%
on August 17. The rapid increase in volatility connectedness was mostly driven
by the biggest four banks. Furthermore, if the current pressure on Turkish Lira
and financial markets continues in the next couple of weeks, the volatility
connectedness is likely to increase further to reach 80% and above. Such a
development would imply that the whole banking system will be in disarray if the
government will not announce the required policy actions immediately after the
Bayram Holiday. Everyone knows that the
Central Bank must increase the policy interest rate to match the current market
interest rates and give a message to investors as the protector of the value of
Turkish Lira. There is not much time left.
Figure 1. Return and
Volatility Connectedness – Turkish Banks
As for the question about whether the Turkish tremors has
led to financial contagion around the globe, we address this question in the
current update of our Financial & Macroeconomic Connectedness website. So far we have updated connectedness graphs
for global stock and foreign exchange markets.
Let us summarize the main conclusion. At least for the
time being, our analysis supports the FT’s viewpoint: “Turkey contagion fears
are overblown.” The Turkish crisis has
not generated contagion (or what we call connectedness) among the 45 stock markets from developed and emerging market economies around the world. (See http://financialconnectedness.org/Stock.html) There is no qualitative change in the
results when only emerging market economy markets are included in the analysis.
One reason for the lack of any contagious effects on others is the size of the
Turkish economy and financial markets: Turkey accounts for around one percent
of the world GDP and global trade, and even less than one percent of the global
financial markets. Another reason why
the tremors of the Turkish crisis are not felt around the globe because, unlike
the East Asian countries, Turkey is not viewed as part of a group of countries
from a region that share similar economic and financial characteristics. The 1997 East Asian crisis started in
Thailand and spread to other countries in the region that faced difficulties in
financial markets. In the Turkish case, there is no such group of countries
that the Turkish troubles would pull into a state of financial crisis.
While the tremors of the Turkish crisis are not generating
connectedness to other markets, earlier this year in February both the stock
and foreign exchange markets got hit by a surge in volatility following the announcement
of a better than expected employment report in the U.S. Markets took this piece
of news as the turning point that would lead to a strong policy reaction by the
Fed. Within a week, the main U.S. equity
index, S&P 500 fell a by 10 percent.
The reflection of the surge in volatility over the week from February 5
to February 12 was a 9-point increase in the stock market volatility
connectedness from 45% to 54%. The index
went up another 4 points in March and early April and 3 points in June to reach
61% in July. Since then the index hovers
around 60-62 % with no upward move. As
of August 17, the volatility connectedness among the global stock markets was
61%.
As of January 15, FX market volatility connectedness dropped
below 50%, the lowest level since April 2007. (See http://financialconnectedness.org/FX.html) However, it did not stay below 50
for long. Within a month-and-a-half the FX market volatility connectedness
index jumped to 56%. Unlike the stock markets however the volatility
connectedness across FX markets experienced a correction in the next few
months. The recent uptick in the FX market connectedness has not been caused by
the travails of the Turkish Lira. Lately
in June, following the U.S. trade policy pressure against China and other
countries’ volatility connectedness increased back to 56% by August 17. Indeed,
Turkish Lira continues to play a very minor role in global FX markets, being a
recipient of the volatility shocks rather than generator of the connectedness
to other countries.
The cracks in the Turkish financial markets appeared rather
too quickly because of the recent diplomatic row with the U.S. on top of the
country’s economic woes and the lack of any policy action. Yet, it appears that irrespective of the speed
with which the crisis is developing, the Turkish crisis has not generated volatility
connectedness or contagion in global stock and foreign exchange market.
Even when we exclude all developed markets and analyzed
connectedness among the emerging markets, the results do no change. Turkey is a
small fish in the pond. Unless we hear
troubles coming from elsewhere the travails of the Turkish financial markets
are not sufficient to pull down the global markets down.